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1. INTRODUCTION
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) have
engineered safety systems to restore the reactor to a safe
state in the event of an accident. Most of the safety systems
have diverse and redundant features. The purpose is to
enhance the availability of these safety systems so that failure
of one of them does not lead to a progression of accidents.
Besides, the reactors have multiple barriers to arrest the
release of activity if a hypothetical accident progresses with
the failure of the safety systems.
In spite of all these, a low probability accident can be
cast beyond the acceptable design basis envelope, which
can progress to a severe accident. Severe accidents which
arise due to multiple failures of safety systems are beyond
design basis accidents and lead to significant core degra-
dation. Whatever be the initiating event, a severe accident
occurs when the heat generation rate exceeds the heat re-
moval rate. The fuel is unable to get cooled and gets dam-
aged, leading to its melt down. The severity of such an
accident depends on the nature and extent of the core dam-
age during the accident progression. Of course, these acci-
dents have very low probability of occurrence, but certainly
they have high risk in terms of consequences to the plant
personnel and public. In view of this, most of the new
generation reactors are designed with built-in severe accident
management strategies. The nuclear utilities also plan to
extend or build additional safety features in existing plants
in order to enhance the defense-in-depth of these plants
so as to cope with such severe accidents.  
Several scenarios can be postulated, which lead to such
core melt down accidents. It can be initiated with a Limited
Core Damage Accident (LCDA) which can involve single
or multiple channels. For example, a feeder break can
result in overheating of the fuel in the affected channel.
Or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with loss of the
Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) system could lead to
widespread fuel damage [1]. In both cases, if moderator
is available as a secondary heat sink, it can prevent the
failure of fuel channels and core degradation. For an
accident to proceed to significant core damage, there must
be failure of multiple fuel channels. This is possible with
the loss of moderator as a heat sink in the case of prolonged
Station Black Out (SBO) [2]. The Severe Core Damage
Accident (SCDA) may be initiated from an LCDA and
progress to significant core damage with the non-availability
of moderator as a heat sink. Hence, the early stage of
SCDA in heavy water reactors is different from that of a
light water reactor in that the presence of a heavy water
moderator slows down the progression of core disassembly.
In a postulated severe core damage accident in a PHWR, multiple failures of core cooling systems may lead to the collapse
of pressure tubes and calandria tubes, which may ultimately relocate inside the calandria vessel forming a terminal debris bed.
The debris bed, which may reach high temperatures due to the decay heat, is cooled by the moderator in the calandria. With
time, the moderator is evaporated and after some time, a hot dry debris bed is formed. The debris bed transfers heat to the
calandria vault water which acts as the ultimate heat sink. However, the questions remain: how long would the vault water be
an ultimate heat sink, and what would be the failure mode of the calandria vessel if the heat sink capability of the reactor vault
water is lost? 
In the present study, a numerical analysis is performed to evaluate the thermal loads and the stresses in the calandria vessel
following the above accident scenario. The heat transfer from the molten corium pool to the surrounding is assumed to be by a
combination of radiation, conduction, and convection from the calandria vessel wall to the vault water. From the temperature
distribution in the vessel wall, the transient thermal loads have been evaluated. The strain rate and the vessel failure have been
evaluated for the above scenario.
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Such multiple failures may lead to the collapse of pressure
tubes and calandria tubes, which may ultimately relocate
inside the calandria vessel forming a terminal debris bed.
With time, this moderator gets evaporated and after some
time, a hot dry debris bed generating heat is retained in
the calandria vessel. The terminal debris ultimately melts
down and forms a molten corium pool in the calandria
vessel. The molten corium pool is surrounded by calandria
vault water which removes the decay heat from the corium. 
In the present study, a numerical analysis is performed
to evaluate the thermal loads and the stresses in the calandria
vessel following the above accident scenarios in case of a
PHWR. The heat transfer from the molten corium pool to
the surrounding is assumed to be by a combination of
radiation, conduction through the wall of the calandria
vessel, and convection from the calandria vessel wall to
the vault water. From the temperature distribution in the
vessel wall, the transient thermal loads have been evaluated.
The strain rate and the vessel failure in the lower head
have been evaluated for the above two scenarios.
2. PHENOMENOLOGY OF ACCIDENT
PROGRESSION WITH STATION BLACK OUT
(SBO) AS AN INITIATING EVENT
In the present study, SBO has been considered as the
postulated initiating event with unavailability of various
safety systems leading to severe accident progression.
The scenarios considered in the present analysis are as
follows:
•Class III and IV power unavailable for sufficiently
long time
•Moderator cooling and shield cooling are unavailable
•Shut down cooling not available
•Main and auxiliary feed water are unavailable
•Steam generator (SG) main steam safety valves are
available, they open and close at set point to relieve
pressure
•Turbine main stop valves are closed after accident
initiation. 
•Emergency core cooling system unavailable
With unavailability of Class IV and Class III power,
the pumps are tripped. Immediately the reactor gets tripped.
Though the pump motor is not working, because of the
flywheel inertia and availability of a heat sink on the
secondary side, thermosyphon flow is established and
decay heat is removed from the core by thermo-syphon till
the heat sink is available.  Since the main steam isolation
valve gets closed, the secondary side steam generator
pressure starts rising. When it crosses the relief valve set
point, the relief valve opens. As a result of which, the
inventory in the SG continuously depletes.  When the
secondary side inventory is boiled off, the heat sink is
lost and primary side pressure starts rising. When primary
pressure exceeds the liquid relief valve set point, it opens
and the primary side inventory is released to the contain-
ment. As the inventory from the primary side is lost, the
fuel, sheath and pressure tube (PT) temperatures start rising.
At a particular temperature (around 900 K), the PT balloons
and contacts the calandria tube (CT). This causes heat
removal through PT and CT to the moderator. The mod-
erator temperature starts rising, and ultimately it starts
boiling. Increase in calandria pressure causes the rupture
disc to blow off, releasing the moderator to the containment
and depleting the moderator level in the calandria. This
causes uncovery of top channels. Due to unavailability of
the moderator as a heat sink, the fuel, sheath, PT, and CT
temperature start rising very fast, which leads to channel
disassembly. The channels are relocated into the remaining
moderator in the form of debris inside the calandria vessel.
After some time, the moderator evaporates and forms the
dry debris, generating heat. The debris ultimately melts
down and forms a molten corium pool in the calandria
vessel. The molten corium pool is surrounded by calandria
vault water which works as a heat sink. With time, if no
replenishment of cooling water into the calandria vessel
is provided, the vault water also boils off and gets depleted.
Subsequently, the calandria wall temperature starts rising.
This causes development of thermal and structural stresses
in the calandria and ultimately it may fail.
3. ANALYSIS STRATEGY
In this work, thermal and structural analysis of a PHWR
calandria vessel was carried out using different codes. A
schematic diagram of the analysis process is as shown in
Fig 1. Three different codes have been used for analysis,
namely RELAP5/Mod3.2, ANSWER and CAST3M. A
brief description of the codes is given as follows:
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Fig. 1. Analysis Process Diagram
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3.1 RELAP5/Mod3.2 
Thermal Hydraulic models of the RELAP5/Mod3.2
code have been used for simulation of the heat transport
system of a PHWR plant. The RELAP5/Mod3.2 code
has been developed for best estimate simulation of light
water reactor coolant systems during normal operation
conditions as well as accidents. The code is based on the
two fluid model which uses six equations for solving the
mass, momentum, and energy conservation for the two
phases i.e. water and steam. The code has been extensively
used for simulation of nuclear thermal hydraulic systems.
3.2 ANSWER
The ANSWER™ software package is a comprehensive
mathematical model for simulation of fluid flow, heat and
mass transport processes in laminar or turbulent, compress-
ible or incompressible flows in porous media. ANSWER™
solves a set of coupled transport equations for fluid veloc-
ities, pressure, temperature, and concentration of chemical
species in multi-phase or multi-fluid, variably saturated,
fractured or porous media flow. The modified energy
equation for porous medium used for present analysis is
as given below.
Energy Equation:
Where:
He is the effective enthalpy per unit volume of porous
media
V is the effective velocity of the component for fluids in
ith direction
H is the total enthalpy of fluid per unit volume
ΓTij is the effective diffusion coefficient for heat
ST is the rate of heat generation per unit volume
The effective enthalpies of the solid and fluid are given
as
Where
hk is the enthalpy of kth phase per unit mass
ΘT is the total porosity of the matrix
Cs is the specific capacity of the solid matrix
ρs is the density of the solid
T is the temperature
3.3 CAST3M:
CAST3M [3] is a computer code for the analysis of
structures by the finite element method (FEM). In CAST3M,
different types of analyses (strains or stresses plane, ax-
isymetry, etc.) can be done. Also, different types of elements
(beams, hulls, etc.), material properties and geometrical
characteristics which cannot be deduced from the meshes
and the boundary conditions can be modelled. Different
types of material behaviour models like elastic, plastic,
elasto-plastic, viscoelastic, viscoplastic, etc. can be used
in the code. In the present problem, elasto-viscoplastic
analysis with the Chaboche model has been carried out.
4. THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS OF PHWR
DURING SBO
Thermal hydraulic analysis of PHWR leading to the
core disassembly was carried out using the computer code
RELAP5/Mod3.2 [4]. The Primary and Secondary Heat
Transport System of the PHWR has been modeled in
RELAP5/Mod3.2 as shown in Fig 2. Channel 1, 2, 4 and
5 are low power channels whereas channel 3 is the hottest
channel. The locations of these channels and number of
clubbed channels in the core are shown in Fig 3 and their
powers in Table 1. The secondary system consists of a
steam generator (SG) downcomer, riser, steam separator,
and steam dome. The turbine has been simulated with a
Time Dependent Volume (TDV) acting as feed water
pumps. The moderator system has also been modeled,
consisting of the calandria as a pipe component and con-
sidering heat loss through PT and CT to the moderator. 
At time t = 0, the SBO is initiated. The boundary con-
ditions are imposed as follows:
•All the pumps tripped
•Reactor is tripped and it is generating decay heat
•Feedwater flow rate reduced to zero
•Moderator circulation pump tripped
•Main steam isolation valve is closed
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Fig. 2. PHWR Nodalization in RELAP5/MOD3.2
With these boundary conditions, the thermal hydraulic
behaviour of the plant was studied. As a result of pump
tripping and the reactor shutdown, slight depressurization
of the primary system is observed. The pressures in the
outlet and inlet header are shown in Fig 4. Due to the closure
of the secondary side, the secondary side pressure rises
and is relieved by the opening of the Main Steam Safety
Valves. As a result of which, the inventory in the SG
continuously depletes (Fig. 5).
At around 6000 s, the inventory in all four SGs is
completely boiled off. As a result, the primary side pressure
rises to the set point of the relief valves at around 6200 s
(Fig. 4). When the pressure increases above the relief valve
set point, it opens and discharges the inventory into the
containment. During this time, the inventory in the primary
side depletes. The mass flow rate in the primary side is
shown in Fig. 6. After tripping of the pumps, the mass flow
rate reduces. The residual flow is due to the combined
action of the pump coast-down initially and then the gradual
build up of thermosyphon. However, after nearly 6500 s,
the thermosyphon flow rate becomes very small because
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Fig. 3. Channel Locations in the Core
Fig. 4. Primary Side Pressures
Fig. 5. Steam Generator Water Level.
Fig. 6. Primary Side Mass Flow Rate
Channel No Power MW
1
2
3
4
5
15
88
311
85
17
Table 1. Channel Powers
of no heat removal from the secondary side. Due to this,
channels get completely voided. As a result, the fuel and
clad temperature start rising. The temperatures of fuel,
sheath, PT, and CT for channel 1 (low power) and channel
3 (hottest) are shown in Figs. 7 and 8.
Since the channels are completely voided and there is
no flow, the clad surface temperature starts rising after
6000 s. After around 7500 s, the sheath temperature starts
rising significantly in the hottest channel (Channel 3, Fig.
8), whereas for low power channels it starts rising after
8500 s. At around 10000 s, the temperature of the PT rises
to about 900 K for channel 3. At this temperature, together
with high pressure conditions, the PT balloons and contacts
the CT.  For low power channels the contact occurs at
nearly 11000 s. Subsequent to contact, the PT temperature
does not rise further. At the same time, heat transfer to
the moderator in the calandria vessel as a result of PT-CT
contact increases. It leads to a pressure increase inside the
calandria. At around 13647 s, the calandria rupture disc
bursts. It leads to flashing of liquid inside the calandria
causing the calandria level to drop to about 6 m (Fig. 9).
As a result, the top two channels (1 and 2) get uncovered.
This leads to an increase in the CT temperature of channel
1 (Fig. 7) whereas channels 3-5 remain submerged and
their CT temperatures are lower. When the CT average
temperature reaches 1473 K, channel disassembly takes
place at 17040 s for channel 1 and 2, whereas the other
channels (3-5) are still intact. Due to the disassembly of
uncovered channels, the primary pressure reduces to at-
mospheric pressure (Fig. 4) at around 17040 s. During this
time, the calandria boiloff is taking place and the level
continuously decreases. At approximately 17691 s the level
falls to 5 m which corresponds to uncovery of 7 rows. After
7 rows are exposed, the core is considered to be collapsed.
After the core collapses, the remaining water from the
calandria is evaporated.
After boil-off of the moderator at around 35000 s (Fig.
9), the temperature of the debris continuously increases.
The heat transfer in the dry debris and its melting have
been simulated using the code ANSWER. The nodalization
scheme of the debris is as shown in Fig. 10. The heat
transfer from the debris to the calandria wall is considered
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Fig. 7. Channel 1 Temperatures Fig. 9. Calandria Water Level
Fig. 10. Calandria Nodalization Scheme in ANSWER
Fig. 8. Channel 3 Temperatures
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to occur by a combination of conduction and radiation,
and from the calandria wall to the vault water by nucleate
boiling. The initial conditions for analysis are given in
Table 2. Fig. 11 shows the temperature in the debris region
and calandria vessel wall. The debris in the central region
is found to be at very high temperature compared to the
bottom and top. This is due to poor thermal conductivity
of the debris bed. At the bottom part, due to a large heat
sink, the temperatures are near the saturation temperature
of water. After the vault water is evaporated, the calandria
wall temperature starts rising after about 200000 s as shown
in Fig. 11. Fig. 12 shows the temperature distribution
inside the debris. It can be seen that most of the debris in
the central region is in molten state, and temperature
decreases towards the wall while the reactor vault water
is still available for cooling the calandria vessel wall. 
5. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE CALANDRIA
VESSEL
An analysis of the thermal stresses inside the calandria
wall was carried out using the Finite Element Method code
CAST3M, taking the boundary conditions predicted from
the thermal hydraulic calculations. All the calculations
were performed with large displacements and large rotations
and employing the Chaboche Viscoplastic model; details
of this constitutive model are explained in Ambroziak et
al [5]. The initial conditions for the analysis are listed in
Table 3. The thermal properties of corium are given in
Table 4. Half cylindrical geometry has been modeled in
3D as shown in Fig. 13. Cub8 (8 noded) elements (40 No.
in circumferential direction, 10 in longitudinal direction
and one element in thickness direction) are used.
Fixed boundary conditions were applied at the end of
the calandria vessel. A symmetry boundary condition was
applied in the longitudinal directions of the calandria vessel.
The temperature loading was applied to the calandria
vessel which is varying with time. The dead weight ofFig. 11. Temperature of Debris and Calandria Vessel
Fig. 12. Temperature Distribution in Calandria wall and Debris
Debris temperature 400 K
Particle porosity
Average particle size
Heat generation rate
Amount of debris
40 % (assumed based on experiments
10 mm
0.5 MW/m3
133000 kg
Table 2. Initial Conditions for ANSWER Analysis
the molten pool has also been considered in calculations.
All material characteristics used in the calculations were
taken from the ASME Section II [6]. Material constants
for the Viscoplastic Chaboche model were taken from
Chellapandi et al. [7]. Plastic strain accumulation in the
calandria under thermal and structural loading was calcu-
lated. Fig. 14 shows the maximum plastic strain accumu-
lation in the calandria wall and Fig. 15 shows the deformed
geometry of the calandria. It can be seen that, as the tem-
perature difference across the vessel is less due to small
thickness, high thermal conductivity, and also the internal
pressure being low, the plastic strain accumulation is low
(~ 9.5 %). The critical value of strain at failure as given by
Chen [8] is 14.73 %.  Hence, it can be said that the calandria
does not undergo creep failure because of temperature and
structural loading. Hence, it is considered to fail due to
melting only.
6. CONCLUSION
In a PHWR, prolonged station blackout leads to severe
core damage leading to collapse of pressure tubes and
calandria tubes inside the calandria in the form of heat
generating debris. Upon loss of the vault water, the calandria
vessel temperature rises rapidly. Under this condition, the
stresses in the calandria wall have been analyzed for possible
failure due to creep using the computer code CAST3M.
The Chaboche model was used for calculation of plastic
strain accumulation in the calandria under thermal and
structural loading. It was observed that the plastic strain
accumulation was not enough to cause failure by creep as
the maximum strain observed (9.5 %) was less than the
critical strain value at failure. Hence, it is concluded that
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Fig. 14. Plastic Strain Accumulation with Time
Fig. 15. Deformed Calandria Geometry
Fig. 13. Calandria Nodalization in CAST3M
Thermal conductivity 1.5 W/mK
Specific Heat
Density
Heat generation rate
750 kJ/kg
8500 kg/m3
0.5 MW/m3
Table 4. Corium Debris Thermal Properties
Vessel temperature As given by Fig 11
Melt weight 133000 kg
Table 3. Initial Conditions for CASTEM Analysis
the calandria does not undergo creep failure because of
temperature and structural loading as long as the calandria
vessel wall is cooled by reactor vault water. The failure of
the calandria occurs mainly due to melting as soon as the
reactor vault water is depleted and the wall cooling is lost.
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